Greening Liberalism by Wissenburg, M.L.J.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/68680
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-06 and may be subject to
change.
24.
Greening Liberalism
by Professor Marcel Wissenburg
Until the 1970s, environmental problems were rarely characterized as environmental and rarely recognized as politi-
cal. It is no miracle then that liberalism, like other humanist political theories, is still learning to assimilate the environ-
ment and environmentalist critique in its conceptual universe
So how green can liberalism be? I tried 
to answer this question in my Green 
Liberalism (London, Routledge 1998) 
by pushing both liberalism and politi-
cal ecologism to their limits. One may 
expect a redistributive, per fectionist 
social liberal to f ind some common 
ground with moderate environmen-
talists, but how about classical liber-
als, liber tarians or even neo-liberals, 
and what about tree-hugging holistic 
ecologists? 
Political theories describe who should 
get what, when and how, and add rea-
sons, a ‘why’, to accept them. Surpris-
ingly, on each of these f ive dimen-
sions even classical liberalism can be 
quite green. Very few green ideas turn 
out to be truly incompatible with core 
liberal convictions. 
Who? 
Ecologists have accused mainstream 
political theories, liberalism foremost, 
of turning not one but two blind eyes 
towards nature. Not only would liber-
alism be an anthropocentric doctrine, 
i.e., fail to consider the moral stand-
ing of non-human nature, it would also
suppor t a very shallow understanding 
of human interests. 
The alternative advocated by the 
‘darkest’ greens, ecocentrism, re-
quires recognition of the intrinsic val-
ue of nature - but unfor tunately, that 
alternative fails to convince, among 
others because in many cases ‘rec-
ognizing intrinsic value’ simply means 
‘nature should mean more to us than 
money’. Few liberals will deny that.
Then again, the critique of anthropo-
centrism forces liberals to reconsider 
why we f ind ourselves so outrageous-
ly morally signif icant but care lit tle 
about bugs. A careful analysis of rele-
vant arguments reveals that liberalism 
is inconsistent here - cer tain animals, 
for instance, satisfy many of the nec-
essary conditions for moral signif i-
cance and none that exclude them.
That does not make them, let alone 
plants, as impor tant as humans 
(blood is thicker than chlorophyll), but 
it does make them more wor thy than 
dir t. So who is benef ited or harmed 
by environmental policies? At the 
very least not just humans. 
What?
Of course environmental problems 
would not exist in a world of inf inite re-
sources. Can liberals regulate the use 
and abuse of natural resources with-
out betraying its belief in individual 
proper ty and individual choice? 
The answer is already given by use of 
the term ‘proper ty’. The rights asso-
ciated with proper ty are more exten-
sive than those attached to holdings 
or possessions; they include rights to 
appropriate or transfer a good, to de-
termine its use and even to destroy it. 
But no right is absolute. Your right to 
throw a brick and thereby break it is 
limited and perhaps even voided by 
my right to an unbroken skull. Each 
and every distinctive right to each 
and every distinctive action should 
at least in principle be justif iable by 
morally and logically sound reasons. 
Now even on classical liberal under-
standing of proper ty rights like John 
Locke’s, nothing can justify thef t, i.e., 
taking what isn’t yours, except dire
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need - and even then compensation 
is due.
That lead me to formulate the Restraint 
Principle for the attribution of rights to 
natural resources, which roughly de-
mands that no goods should be tak-
en from nature unless it is to satisfy 
needs rather than wants, and unless 
it is replaced by an in all respects simi-
lar or equivalent good. Even classical 
liberalism can, then, accept ‘limits to 
growth’ and environmentally inspired 
limits to proper ty use. 
When?
Under this heading, a very special 
class of philosophical questions are 
grouped: those relating to future 
generations. One of the emotionally 
strongest arguments in favour of en-
vironmental concerns is the ef fect of 
our actions on the lives and welfare of 
our children or grandchildren - global 
warming, for instance, was discussed 
in these terms twenty years ago, 
showing that a strong argument does.
not necessarily have to be ef fective 
One problem with future generations, 
however, is that they do not yet exist. 
In fact, no par ticular future individual 
X will ever exist unless parents and 
society conspire to create X at the ex-
act right moment under the exact right 
circumstances. 
So can X blame us for, say, exterminat-
ing the rhino if without the rhino going 
extinct, X would not even exist? How 
can X be worse of f by existing rather 
than not existing, how can those two 
even be compared? In other words: if 
we cannot harm future generations, 
why bother doing anything for them? 
There are ways around this quite per-
verse dilemma  - but those that are 
compatible with liberal assumptions 
create another problem: somehow, 
individual parents are then made re-
sponsible for the choice to procreate, 
for any consequences in terms of lives 
not wor th living for their of fspring, and 
for any negative impact on the avail-
able resources for already existing
humans who chose not to procreate. 
And that may be too much of a re-
sponsibility for anyone to cope with.It 
is not as if liberals can f ind a satisfac-
tory answer here that others, includ-
ing ecologists, cannot. The discus-
sion does however show that liberals 
can address green ideas as seriously 
as ecologists themselves should.
How?
We may assume that liberals can and 
occasionally even should be far green-
er than they are, both by taking more 
interests on board than shor t-term 
human greed alone and by reasser t-
ing the originally ecologically sound 
Lockean limits to proper ty rights.We 
may also assume - for reasons I ex-
plained in my book - that liberals will 
acknowledge that technological ‘sup-
ply-side’ solutions can only postpone, 
not solve, environmental problems; 
the crucial factor in controlling and 
balancing the ecology is demand: 
population size and individual con-
sumption. Even here, a classical lib-
eral government can f ind room to do 
more than sit back and watch a Mal-
thusian disaster developing; there are 
legitimate ways to promote a fair con-
sideration of environmentally more 
benign desires and preferences in the 
private sphere. Liberalism, even in its 
classical gown, can create a sustain-
able society. What it cannot do is pro-
mote, let alone impose, one par ticular 
ideal of the sustainable society at the 
expense of others. Depending on how 
well free, intelligent and adult individu-
als can learn to critically reconsider 
and control their desires, the liberal 
sustainable society can be anything 
in between a global Yellowstone Park 
and a global Manhattan, fed on sea 
weed and algae. 
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